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Recent years have seen the expansion of the military’s visibility and social 
role in many democracies. Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, democracies 
across the world had been deploying their militaries in an expanding range 
of operations. This has raised concerns about a return of the military as a 
political actor and the militarisation of democratic politics.
 • Worries about the military becoming the “gravedigger of democracy” have re-
surfaced once again in recent years. Military coups in Africa, the expansion of 
military roles in law enforcement in Latin America, and an intensification of geo-
strategic conflicts in Asia have raised concerns about the militarisation of poli-
tics and its dangers for democratic processes, political rights, and civil liberties.
 • However, across the world’s democracies, there are few signs of a coherent 
trend towards the “material” militarisation of politics. Military coups and other 
forms of undue military influence on government formation are the exception 
in democratic countries, and the relative resource endowment of the military 
has actually declined over the last three decades.
 • Nonetheless, there has been a worrying trend of democracies deploying their 
militaries for an increasing range of non-traditional missions in response to 
external or domestic security threats, including anti-terrorism activities, crime 
fighting, and the maintenance of law and order. 
 • To legitimate these non-traditional missions, democratic governments have 
engaged in a militarisation of the security discourse which portrays the use of 
military force as justified and “normal.” Over the medium to long term, these 
militarised discourses may lead to material militarisation and the erosion of 
civilian control and democratic quality.
Policy Implications
Democracies deploy their militaries in a range of operations, which are often 
accompanied by a militarised security discourse to legitimise the use of military 
force as a socially acceptable or “normal” tool of civilian politics. Over time, these 
militarised discourses may lead to material militarisation and the erosion of ci-
vilian control and democratic quality. External actors should, therefore, focus 
not only on reining in military coups and other forms of undue military influence 
on democratic politics, but also support the demilitarisation of security discours-
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As a reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic many countries in the world have deployed 
military forces to support ailing civilian administrative agencies and enforce cur-
fews. This has not been confined to autocratic regimes in poor countries of the Glob-
al South with a long history of military involvement in politics, but has also taken 
place in many rich democracies of “the West” with uncontested civilian control over 
the armed forces. Nonetheless, in combination with a resurgence of military coups 
in Africa, an expansion of military roles in law enforcement in Latin America, and 
an intensification of geostrategic conflicts in Asia, there is concern about the mili-
tary becoming a “gravedigger of democracy” that threatens democratic processes, 
curtails political rights, and undermines civil liberties (Kuehn 2019). This echoes 
a broader debate, expertly reviewed in a series of recent GIGA Focus publications, 
about whether we are witnessing a return of the military to the political scene after 
three decades of political dormancy.
In this GIGA Focus Global, we consider the evidence for a global trend toward 
the (re-)militarisation of politics in democracies. We argue that militarisation has 
two dimensions, one material and the other discursive. Material militarisation 
refers to the increase in power resources under the military’s control; discursive 
militarisation refers to the legitimation of the use of the military force as a socially 
acceptable or “normal” tool of civilian politics. While we do not find evidence of an 
overall material militarisation, we do see a trend towards the militarisation of po-
litical discourses in some of the world’s democracies. These militarised discourses 
may lead to material militarisation and the erosion of civilian control and demo-
cratic quality. Therefore, it is essential for democracies to be wary of militarising 
security discourses.
Global Patterns of Material Militarisation
To evaluate global patterns and trends in the role of the military in politics, we 
consider three aspects of material militarisation: coup d’états, military influence 
on the formation and dissolution of governments, and the relative weight of the 
military in society. 
Military Coups
The number of coup d’états has declined significantly over the last three decades. 
According to data from Powell and Thyne (2011), a total of 96 coup attempts took 
place from 1990 to 2019, 55 of which occurred in the 1990s alone.[1] The follow-
ing decades have seen considerably fewer instances of open military intervention. 
In the first decade of this century, a total of 23 coup attempts were counted, and 
there were 18 coup attempts between 2011 and 2019 (see Figure 1). Not all regime 
types are similarly vulnerable to coups, however. In fact, coups are overwhelmingly 
a problem for authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Of the 96 coup attempts counted 
by Powell and Thyne since the end of the Cold War, 77 (80 per cent) have occurred 
in countries that were autocracies in the year previous to the coup according to the 
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge, Gerring, and Knutsen et al. 
2020). Only 19 coup attempts have been staged against formally democratic re-
1 Powell and Thyne 
(2011: 252) define coups 
as “overt attempts by the 
military or other elites with-
in the state apparatus to 
unseat the sitting head of 
state using unconstitutional 
means.” While this includes 
interventions staged by 
civilians, Powell and Thyne 
note that typically no 
coups are possible without 
the military’s support.
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gimes. These include the 1992 and 2002 coup attempts in Venezuela, the 2006 coup 
in Thailand, and the 2012 coup in Mali. 
Military Influence on Government Formation
A second material form of militarisation is military influence on the making and 
breaking of governments below the threshold of a military coup. This includes, on 
the one hand, the military’s role in state and regime security operations. When po-
litical leaders are challenged by mass protests that overwhelm the capacities of the 
civilian security apparatus, the military becomes the regime’s last line of defence. 
In these “endgames” (Pion-Berlin, Esparza, and Grisham 2014), the military ul-
timately decides on the political fate of the political leaders. A crucial example is 
Venezuelan president Maduro’s ability to stay in power in the face of two years 
of ongoing protests, secured not least by political and coercive support from the 
country’s military. During the 2019 anti-regime protests in Algeria and Sudan, on 
the other hand, the countries’ leaders lost the support of the military, which sided 
with the opposition and toppled presidents Bouteflika and al Bashir (Kuehn, Crois-
sant, and Eschenauer-Engler 2019). As is the case with coups, these “endgame” 
situations mainly occur in dictatorships. Military involvement in violence against 
unarmed anti-government protests is extremely rare in democracies, where strong 
constitutional safeguards as well as professional military norms regulate and pro-
hibit such operations. Instances such as those during the 2019/20 Chilean pro-
tests, where democratically elected presidents call on the army to disperse (mostly) 
peaceful demonstrators, are the exception rather than the rule (Pion-Berlin and 
Acácio 2020).
On the other hand, military influence on government formation and dissolution 
can also take a more institutionalised form, with the executive being dependent 
on the military’s at least tacit support. Drawing on data from the V-Dem project, 
Fig. 1
Coups and Coup At-
tempts from 1991 to 
2019
Source: Figure by the 
authors, based on data 
from Powell and Thyne 
2011.
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Figure 2 shows the average dependence of governments on the military’s support in 
autocracies and democracies since the end of the Cold War.[2] The figure suggests 
that, on average, military influence on governments is considerably and consist-
ently higher in non-democratic regimes than in democracies. However, even in dic-
tatorships the overall dependence of the political leaders on the military has been 
almost steadily declining since the early 1990s. In democracies, in turn, we see a 
steady level of very low military influence, which has increased slightly in the last 
few years, however.
The Military’s Resources
A third material indicator of militarisation is the amount of societal resources al-
located to the armed forces. To evaluate this, we draw on the Global Militariza-
tion Index (GMI) from the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), which 
includes military expenditures, the size of the armed forces, and their arsenal of 
heavy weapons (Mutschler 2019). Figure 3 shows the trends in the average GMI for 
democracies and dictatorships from 1991 to 2018. After the end of the Cold War, 
democracies were, on average, considerably more militarised than authoritarian 
regimes. However, the data show that while autocracies, on average, increased 
spending on their militaries throughout the first decade of this century and thereby 
returned to 1990s levels of militarisation, democracies, on average, demilitarised 
almost continuously after a brief increase in the early 1990s. In 2018, the last year 
for which GMI data is available at the time of writing, the average degree of milita-
risation was considerably lower in democracies than in autocracies.
2 We measure the mili-
tary’s institutionalised influ-
ence on the government 
based on V-Dem’s military 
dimension index, which 
the captures the “extent 
to which the appointment 
and dismissal of the chief 
executive is based on the 
threat or actual use of 
military force” (Coppedge, 
Gerring, and Knutsen et al. 
2020: 272). To illustrate the 
overall development across 
time, we have calculated 
the average index value 
per year for democracies 
and autocracies.
Fig. 2
Military Influence on 
Government Forma-
tion, 1991–2019
Source: Figure by the 
authors, based on data 
from Coppedge, Gerring, 
and Knutsen et al. 2020.
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If anything, then, the overall global trend since the end of the Cold War has been 
towards material demilitarisation. This is particularly true for democracies, which 
have, on average, seen small and declining numbers of coups, very low average lev-
els of military involvement in government formation and dissolution, and steady 
declines in the relative allocation of resources to their military institutions over the 
last three decades. While a number of explanations have been fielded to explain 
these developments (Kuehn 2018), two factors are relevant: First, democracies tend 
to be less vulnerable to military political incursion than authoritarian regimes be-
cause of the pacifying function of their democratic institutions and the role of civil 
society in maintaining democracy. Second, after the end of the Cold War, the threat 
environment for many democracies changed dramatically, mainly with the break-
down of the Soviet Bloc. The reduction in these threats has led many democracies 
to downsize their militaries to better perform a new range of small-scale missions. 
However, as we discuss below, often these new missions have been paralleled by 
a militarisation of the security discourse that could indirectly harm civil-military 
relations and put a strain on democratic quality over the medium to long term.
Discursive Militarisation in Democracies
The range of missions for which democracies have deployed their militaries since 
the end of the Cold War include traditional external defence and power projec-
tion operations, such as the United States of America’s and other “Western” de-
mocracies’ operations in response to Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. 
However, most military deployments have represented a variety of asymmetric and 
non-traditional missions. Some have taken place in response to external security 
challenges, such as South Africa’s border security operations, Israel’s campaigns in 
Fig. 3
Global Militariza-
tion Index (GMI), 
1991–2018
Source: Figure by the 
authors, based on data 
from Mutschler 2019.
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Lebanon and Gaza, peacekeeping and regional stabilisation missions (e.g. NATO’s 
ISAF campaign in Afghanistan), or the large number of UN peacekeeping missions 
in post-conflict societies. 
In addition, democracies have also assigned their militaries an increasingly 
broader range of domestic roles. French soldiers, for instance, patrol cities in re-
sponse to terrorist attacks, and Latin American militaries combat organised crime 
and armed insurrection. Furthermore, we can observe the militarisation of police 
forces in many democratic countries in order to deal with domestic and transna-
tional terrorism. Finally, and not least in response to the global Covid-19 pandemic, 
the military has taken on multiple additional roles supporting civilian authorities 
in both security- and non-security related functions in many established and new 
democracies. In many such instances, military deployment has been couched in a 
militarised security discourse, which has reinforced the status of the armed forces 
and their cultural importance and legitimised the use of military force (Levy 2016). 
When security discourses are militarised, the military becomes the preferred tool 
with which to address domestic or external threats and the effective scope of debate 
over policies is narrowed down to a limited set of alternatives. Military deployment 
to deal with security threats, however, does not mean that discursive militarisation 
is an inevitable outcome.
In a forthcoming edited volume, the authors have comparatively evaluated the 
findings of 10 case studies on democracies which are similar in that they face vari-
ous security threats, but which differ significantly in the extent to which they deploy 
the military to counter these challenges (Kuehn and Levy forthcoming). Table 1 
presents a summary of these case studies.
Country Main threat State response Security discourse
External threats
Israel Terrorism and foreign 
states
Military Militarised
Japan Foreign state Military “Soft” militarisation
South Korea Foreign state Military Militarised
USA Terrorism Military Militarised
Domestic threats
Colombia Insurgency, crime Military Militarised
El Salvador Crime Military Militarised
France Terrorism Military and police Partly militarised
Senegal Insurgency Police Not militarised
South Africa Border security, crime Military and police Partly militarised
Spain Terrorism Police Not militarised
External Threats and Militarised Security Discourse
Four out of the 10 countries examined face threats emanating from outside their 
borders. Israel’s main threat stems from Arab countries and Iran; Japan’s national 
security has been challenged by China’s and, to a lesser extent, North Korea’s ascent 
as regional and assertive powers in its neighbourhood. In South Korea, the main 




Militarisation in 10 
Democracies
Source: Kuehn and 
Levy, forthcoming.
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threat also emanates from outside the country’s borders, but since the 9/11 attacks 
it has primarily taken the form of transnational Islamist terrorist groups such as 
Al Qaeda. These diverse democracies routinely rely on their militaries to respond 
to these external threats. In Israel, the military guards the borders to Lebanon and 
the Palestinian Authority, and it projects power to deter regional threats, especially 
from Iran. The Japanese Self-Defence Forces patrol the sea lanes and run aircraft 
interdictions in order to limit Chinese assertiveness. In South Korea, the military 
guards the border along the 38th parallel and thwarts North Korean incursions in 
cyberspace and the maritime and aerial theatres. Finally, the US military has played 
a key role in the country’s fight against Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist organisa-
tions. 
Not all democracies that have used their military in response to external threats 
have exhibited a militarisation of the security discourse. In Israel, military thought 
has traditionally governed political thought regarding the response to the hostil-
ity of the Arab countries. Following the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, 
the hostilities between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the militarised dis-
course was also religionised, in that religious symbols gradually became prominent. 
In South Korea, the media played a key role in militarising the security discourse 
through the way it interpreted North Korea’s crossings of the de facto maritime bor-
der between the two Koreas, while also criticising more restrictive government poli-
cies. In the USA, an existing, heavily militarised security discourse was transferred 
to the problem of transnational terrorism after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Japan, 
in contrast, exhibited a softer version of militarisation in response to its external 
threats. To justify the strengthening of the military to cope with the tensions with 
China and North Korea, Japan’s governments have consistently pursued a policy 
of creating public understanding that military forces are needed for the defence of 
the country. However, this has been a kind of “soft” militarisation that has avoided 
glorifying the military or the use of force. Thus, the case of Japan reminds us that 
militarisation is not necessarily the outcome of military deployment.
Domestic Threats and Militarised Security Discourse
This can also be observed from the analysis of those democracies faced with do-
mestic threats. In Spain and France, domestic terrorism by Jihadist terror cells 
linked to Al Qaeda and the so-called “Islamic State” has been the main security 
challenge since the end of the Cold War. In Senegal and Colombia, the state has 
been challenged by long-standing armed insurgencies. Even after the Colombian 
state’s peace deal with the largest guerrilla group in 2016, the state’s monopoly on 
violence has continued to be challenged by heavily armed and well-organised crime 
syndicates. Similar to the case in Colombia, crime also has become the main threat 
in El Salvador since the end of the country’s bloody civil war, and in post-apartheid 
South Africa. In contrast to their responses to external challenges, not all democra-
cies in our study have viewed the military as the primary instrument to be deployed 
against domestic threats. In both Colombia and El Salvador, the military has been 
the central actor in the fight against crime and in the so-called “War on Drugs,” 
even after the end of the civil wars in these countries. Crime fighting has also been 
on the agenda for the South African military in the post-apartheid era, even though 
   8    GIGA FOCUS | GLOBAL | NO. 6 | DECEMBER 2020 
the main burden has been shouldered by civilian police forces and, increasingly, 
private security providers. In France, the military plays a role in supporting the 
police in anti-terror operations by guarding public spaces – very much in contrast 
to Spain, where the military has not been involved in domestic security operations 
against Islamist terrorists. In Spain, as in the Senegalese state’s struggle against the 
separatist insurgency in the southern Casamance region, it is civilian paramilitary 
police forces that have been the main security agencies, the Guardia Civil in Spain 
and the gendarmerie in Senegal. 
In those instances where the military has been deployed internally, this has 
been couched in a militarised security discourse that has legitimised and justified 
the military’s role. In El Salvador, presidents from both major parties have framed 
criminals and particularly youth gangs (maras) as existential threats to citizen se-
curity, which must be fought by the military due to the inability of the police to con-
tain surging homicide rates. By defining gang members as non-citizens, politicians 
have justified both military deployment and excessive violence. A similar pattern 
can be observed in Colombia, where a variety of discursive patterns, such as the de-
monisation of insurgents, have legitimised the application of military force against 
criminal organisations, while with securitisation, security has become the most im-
portant right that Colombians should enjoy. In France, the military has been de-
ployed in internal policing roles to struggle with transnational terrorism, but over 
time securitisation rather than militarisation has developed. In South Africa, the 
post-apartheid era saw a trend towards demilitarisation. However, since the end 
of the first decade of this century, growing poverty and inequality have contributed 
to rising levels of domestic violence. This has marked the beginning of a new era 
of securitisation and militarisation, but in a manner characterised by growth in 
“privatised militarism” developed in civil society rather than the empowerment of 
the military and its symbols. Elected elites in Spain, in contrast, did not militarise 
the security discourse in response to domestic Basque and Jihadist terrorism, but 
actually stressed that this was a problem to be dealt with through robust and inte-
grated police and intelligence work. In Senegal, the security discourse around the 
Casamance conflict remained decidedly non-militarised as successive governments 
combined limited repressive means, led by the civilian gendarmerie, and political 
accommodation to achieve a diplomatic solution to the conflict. 
Historical Legacies of Militarisation
How do we explain these differing patterns in democracies’ willingness to deploy 
the military in response to external and domestic threats and the respective socie-
ties’ receptiveness to militarised discourses? The case studies in our analysis sug-
gest that historical legacies of an existing militaristic cultural infrastructure are 
crucial. For example, in Israeli culture, it is the memory of the holocaust; in Japan, 
it is deeply engrained memories of war-time devastation and nuclear destruction; 
and in South Korea, it is the legacies of decades of military-led politics. Threats and 
the possible reactions to them are framed against this historical context, which af-
fects the way in which threats are “read” and the measures taken to address them. 
In the case of Japan, these historical patterns have placed limits on remilitarisation, 
while in Israel and South Korea they encouraged a more aggressive stance. His-
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torical legacies also affect civilian politicians’ proclivity to engage in a militarised 
security discourse relating to domestic threats. The security discourse around the 
drug cartels in Colombia and criminal youth gangs in El Salvador are examples, as 
is the language of war in France’s anti-terrorism operations. In Spain, in contrast, 
the military’s involvement in domestic affairs was and continues to be delegitimised 
in large segments of Spanish society after decades of Francoist rule in which the 
military was a core pillar of the repressive regime. 
Discursive Militarisation and Democratic Quality
Does discursive militarisation and the use of the military in non-traditional mis-
sions endanger the quality of democracy, and especially the degree of control and 
oversight that elected civilians have over the military? Our case studies suggest that 
militarisation indeed leads to the medium- to long-term empowerment of the armed 
forces and might endanger democratic quality – under certain circumstances. First, 
we have found that the impact of militarisation depends on the nature of the threat. 
When democratic governments rely on the military to deal with domestic threats, 
the degree and quality of civilian control over the military as well as democratic 
quality suffers. When civilians need the military to repress the political opposition 
or fight domestic insurgents, they become dependent on the military’s coercive 
abilities. This dependence will undermine civilians’ will and ability to reign in a 
power-hungry military. Moreover, long-term involvement in internal conflicts and 
domestic counter-insurgency will give the military incentives to develop doctrines 
and procedures and adapt its structure to become an even more effective political 
actor. Finally, military deployment for “constabulary” law-enforcement duties is 
likely to lead to human rights violations and the curtailment of civil rights (Flores-
Macías and Zarkin 2019). 
Second, we have found that regarding external threats, the relationship between 
militarisation on the one hand and the military’s political power and democratic 
quality on the other is less linear. Here, the level of mobilisation plays a crucial role. 
When democratic governments need to mobilise a large share of societal resources 
in response to an external threat, this generates great pressure for the democrati-
cally elected authorities, as well as interest groups and the media, to effectively 
monitor the armed forces’ actions. For example, increasing concerns in Japan about 
growing external threats from an increasingly assertive China have enhanced the 
military’s status and militarised political culture. However, more investment in se-
curity has also led extra-institutional agents to monitor the armed forces. 
On the other hand, civilian control has weakened in the United States of Amer-
ica. Notwithstanding the high level of militarisation, Congressional oversight over 
the use of force has been eroded due to the increasing importance of covert intel-
ligence and special operations forces instead of large-scale troop deployments in 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it is not these covert operations alone that 
have reduced the transparency of the application of military force. Since these “sur-
gical” special operations have entailed little threat of large numbers of American 
casualties and have been comparatively cheap in terms of material costs, there has 
been little need for large-scale mobilisation of resources. This echoes Charles Tilly’s 
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(1992) famous argument that large-scale mobilisation is conducive to democracy 
as it increases the dependence of the ruling elites on the consent of the governed. 
Policy Implications
The main insight to be drawn from our analysis is that militarisation is still a prob-
lem in democracies. However, the main issue is not so much material militarisation 
in the guise of a coup d’état or undue military influence in politics and society, even 
though these still occur. Rather, the current threat to democracies emanating from 
militarisation is one promoted mainly by civilian agents using the apolitical image 
of the military to market policies. 
This is also evident in states’ use of their militaries in response to the Covid-19 
pandemic. Governments across the world have deployed their militaries to fulfil a 
multitude of functions: the provision of logistical and medical support to civilian 
agencies, such as the dispatching of soldiers to the production line at local mask 
factories in Taiwan; the assignment of military supplies and equipment to civilian 
agencies, such as the deployment of a military hospital ship in the US; the provision 
of assistance to police forces in maintaining order (e.g., in Spain); the assumption 
of operative responsibility for the management of civilian services, such as the op-
eration of epidemiological investigations by the military Home Front Command in 
Israel. On the surface, these military operations are instrumental in fighting the 
pandemic. However, these military deployments are often couched in a militarised 
discourse, which frames Covid-19 as a national security threat. Rhetoric such as 
that of French president Macron, who has styled himself as the commander-in-chief 
in the war against the virus, is emblematic of the securitisation and militarisation of 
policy discourse. Ultimately, such framing could be used to justify drastic measures, 
such as the imposition of lockdowns, the forbidding of large gatherings, and other 
measures suspending human rights and freedoms, such as those currently seen in 
Hungary. Furthermore, this type of militarised discourse has narrowed the scope of 
debates and made enemies of categories of people that are framed as threatening. It 
is not that militaries have carried out their role in a usurpative manner, but rather 
that civilian-led militarisation of the policy discourse has capitalised on the high 
level of public trust enjoyed by the armed forces. However, given the experiences 
of the case studies, we worry that the militarised discourse might weaken civilian 
control and undermine democratic quality in the long term. 
What do these findings suggest political decision-makers and civil society ac-
tors should do to avert the negative impacts of military deployment for non-tradi-
tional missions on civilian control of the military? We make three core recommen-
dations. First, when governments use military resources in response to external 
or domestic security threats or in support of ailing civilian administrative agen-
cies, these resources need to be used in a way that is constitutional and limited 
both in terms of scope and time. Moreover, and particularly when the military is 
asked to use its overwhelming coercive means in domestic law and order opera-
tions, clear and transparent rules of engagement need to be defined by democratic 
governments and overseen by elected legislatures, the media, and civil society or-
ganisations. Second, external actors need to include both forms of militarisation in 
their activities for promoting democracy and civilian control in recipient countries. 
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These activities should include support to reduce material sources of militarisation 
– for instance, by reining in regional arms races, which raise military expenditures 
and, in turn, enhance military power. They should also include support to limit the 
discursive aspect of militarisation. Third, the rich democracies of the Global North 
should lead by example. More effort must be made to control the securitisation of 
national crises and the militarisation of the security discourse within the donor 
countries. This requires open and deliberative decision-making processes in which 
the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role in addressing the legitimacy of 
the use of military force. Such democratic control of discursive militarisation in-
cludes self-restraint on the part of democratically elected governments in declaring 
“war” on abstract concepts such as “drugs,” “terror,” or the “pandemic” or designat-
ing certain social groups as “the enemy.” It also requires the political opposition, 
civil society groups, and the media to abstain from these practices while pushing for 
government restraint by being vigilant against governments’ militarised rhetoric, 
calling out attempts to militarise the discourse, and holding the government ac-
countable for the military’s actions.
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